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Abstract: The boundary organization concept has been used to establish that collaborative arrangements and outputs across science and
policy domain boundaries need to be credible, relevant, and legitimate in order to be to be effective. Although widely accepted in other
issue-driven fields, this concept does not have equivalent currency in the natural hazard and disaster risk reduction context. This paper uses
the development of the New Zealand Natural Hazards Research Platform during a recent earthquake disaster to assess the utility of the
concept in this topic area. Lessons are also identified concerning the use of larger consortium organizations to increase policy and other end-
user involvement in the management and coordination of research funding, and the impact of a major disaster on this research-funding
initiative. Mapping the Platform’s collaborative arrangements in relation to boundary tensions over time makes it possible to distinguish
disaster effects from preexisting and ongoing structural effects and incentive regimes. Largely based in the research domain, this organi-
zation was well placed to resist the negative pressure of postdisaster time compression on research quality. The lack of balancing policy
input at all levels made it difficult to resist the effect of this pressure on the networking required to integrate disciplinary, organizational, and
higher-level science/policy domains, and thus build the legitimacy of the larger collaboration. The utility of the boundary organization
concept stemmed from the emphasis on balance across domains and scales. The focus on effects, trends, and patterns serves as a counter-
weight to the blame attribution common after high-profile disasters. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)NH.1527-6996.0000202. This work is made
available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Author keywords: Research/policy integration; Credibility; Relevance; Legitimacy; Boundary organization; Postdisaster time
compression; Canterbury earthquake sequence; Natural hazards research platform.
Introduction
In 2009, the Natural Hazards Research Platform (the Platform) was
tasked with bringing major research organizations together with
policy and other stakeholders to coordinate research funding and
activities in New Zealand’s national interest. Within 12 months
of inception, however, this newly established organization was re-
quired to coordinate the research response to New Zealand’s largest
natural disaster in 70 years, the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquake
sequence (Canterbury earthquakes). In this case study, the boundary
organization concept is used to analyze the first five years of the Plat-
form’s development. It has two concurrent aims. Lessons are iden-
tified concerning the use of larger consortium organizations to
increase policy and other end-user involvement in the management
and coordination of research funding, and the impacts of a major
disaster on such research-funding initiatives. At the same time,
the case study is also used to illustrate the utility of the boundary
organization concept in the natural hazard and disaster risk reduction
context.
The boundary organization concept is informed by a range of
scholarship focused on cross-sector collaborations, including the
activities of government advisory bodies, international climate
change and biodiversity initiatives, and, in environmental manage-
ment contexts, collaborative approaches to the management of
shared resources (Jasanoff 1990; Guston 2001; Cash et al. 2003;
McNie 2007; Van den Hove 2007; Berkes 2009). It is most often
used to refer to collaborative arrangements used to manage the in-
tersection or boundary, between scientific and policy domains, with
the aim of facilitating the joint construction of knowledge to enrich
policy and other decision making (Van den Hove 2007; Guston
2001). This concept also can be applied, to any cross-sector col-
laboration, and to collaborative arrangements involving multiple
stakeholder domains (Cash et al. 2003; Guston 1999). All science/
nonscience collaborations must deal with inevitable tensions be-
tween scientific drivers, norms, and behaviors, and those of other
domains (Cash et al. 2003; Bruneel et al. 2010). The policy need
for relevant, demand-driven real-time knowledge, for example,
often appears in tension with the supply-driven knowledge pro-
vided in the scientific domain, and the time-consuming verification
and peer-review processes required to establish scientific credibility
(Cash et al. 2003; Van den Hove 2007; Sarkki et al. 2014; Clark and
Majone 1985; Hackett 1997). Although boundary organizations
use a range of strategies to incorporate and manage such tensions,
this management is most effective when the organization produces
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outcomes that are beneficial to both—or all—of the domains
involved (Guston 2001). Such collaborative activity is thus driven
by the need for legitimacy, which involves fairness and balance
(Cash et al. 2003; Sarkki et al. 2014; Guston 2001).
The utility of the boundary organization concept lies not only
in the identification of the tensions between domain drivers that
affect all such collaborations, but also in its focus on the mix of
functions and processes that mitigate the inhibiting effects of these
tensions. The focus is on understanding systematic effects, patterns,
and trends, shifting the emphasis away from individual or organi-
zational performance. Offering a schematic template for design,
implementation, and assessment in a range of issue-driven and dis-
ciplinary fields (Van den Hove 2007), this concept has become
established in areas where large, complex issues have significant
economic and political consequences. These include biodiversity
(Koetz et al. 2008, 2012; Sarkki et al. 2014), sustainable develop-
ment (Hotes and Opgenoorth 2014; Runhaar and van Nieuwaal
2010), climate change (Lee et al. 2014; Hoppe et al. 2013; Friman
and Strandberg 2014; Iyalomhe et al. 2013), and public health
(Drimie and Quinlan 2011; Casale et al. 2009; Creech 2001), as
well as environmental management, where the boundary organiza-
tion concept first gained traction (Sternlieb et al. 2013; Pesch et al.
2012; Parker and Crona 2012; Crona and Hubacek 2010; Van den
Hove 2007).
Disaster risk reduction is a complex issue of significant eco-
nomic and political consequence, however there has been little ap-
plication of the boundary organization concept in this context to
date. This is despite widespread acknowledgment of the need for
more integrative hazard and disaster research approaches (Tobin and
Montz 1997; Miletti 1999; Alexander 2007; Kapucu et al. 2010).
Global calls for more interdisciplinary and integrated approaches
to disaster risk reduction, with closer collaboration between re-
searchers and end users (including practitioners and communities,
as well as policy and other decision makers) inform major initia-
tives through international science bodies, such as the International
Council of Science Unions (ICSU) and the International Social
Science Council (ISSC) (ICSU 2008). The drive to create a more
integrated research environment is also official United Nations
disaster risk reduction policy (ICSU 2003, 2005a, b, 2008,
2010; UNISDR 2005, 2011). The recent Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction, for example, commits signatory countries
to the establish coordinating governance arrangements, such as na-
tional platforms, to increase the integration of stakeholders across
domains, sectors, and levels, and to “foster cooperation among
scientific and technological communities, other relevant stakehold-
ers and policymakers in order to facilitate a science-policy interface
for effective decision-making in disaster risk management”
(UNISDR 2015, p. 13). Recent identifications of a significant re-
search shortfall concerning the uptake of science into policy have
included the need for more research into the effectiveness of
research/end-user partnerships in facilitating evidence-based poli-
cies and programs (ICSU 2003, 2005a, b, 2008, 2010; Few and
Barclay 2011).
This article aims to address this shortfall by assessing the utility
of the boundary organization concept in the hazard and disaster
context, focusing in particular on the use of such organizations after
disasters. It has been well established that major disasters signifi-
cantly compress the time available for policy and other decision
making (Johnson and Mamula-Seddon 2014; Olshansky et al.
2012; Fordham 2007; Drabek 2007). The need for timely policy-
relevant information has been in fundamental tension with the
consensus building required to achieve both scientific credibility
and legitimacy (Sarkki et al. 2014; Parker and Crona 2012; Hackett
1997; Fordham 2007). Thus, assessing the utility of the boundary
organization concept in this context also provides insights into
the Platform’s negotiation of this tension, pointing to the value of
this concept as a design tool when planning postdisaster research
response. Lessons are also drawn concerning the impact of the dis-
aster on this research-funding program, and the exacerbating effects
of the postdisaster environment on initial structural constraints limit-
ing this organization’s capacity to engage in the policy domain.
The case study is largely based on secondary data. This includes
a range of Platform and other government documentation in the
public domain, including the ministry of civil defense and emer-
gency management (MCDEM) review of the emergency response
(McLean et al. 2012), and the Royal Commission of Enquiry into
the Canterbury earthquakes report (Cooper et al. 2012), material
from the National Crisis Management Center (NCMC) log during
the state of national emergency (February 22–April 30, 2011), and
the 2014 Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Economics (MBIE)
review of the Platform (Buwalda et al. 2014), as well as scientific
and grey literature (www.greylit.org) concerning the Canterbury
earthquake sequence and its impacts, as available. We also draw
on observational and other data collected by the authors. All were
involved in aspects of the larger response operation to this event,
with some representing the Platform on the science desk at the




In recent decades, complex, fragmented, and ever more globalized
policy-making environments have required democratic governments
to rely increasingly on nonstate scientific, financial, and other ex-
pertise for resources and cooperation (Jasanoff 1990; Gluckman
2013; Skogstad 2003). An associated emphasis on the importance
of basing policy on scientific and other evidence has also fuelled
calls for more integrative research approaches in order to improve
the integration of science into policy and practice (Gluckman 2013;
Skogstad 2003; McNie 2007). Evolving out of this wider environ-
ment, the boundary organization concept is informed by complex
systems theory, ecology, and related constructivist understandings
of the distinction between science and nonscience domains as a
boundary between complex discursive systems (Jasanoff 1990;
Guston 2001; Berkes 2009). Diverse disciplinary origins have also
given rise to other closely related concepts, including science/policy
interface (Van den Hoven 2007; Sarkki et al. 2014), boundary man-
agement, or systems for the translation of knowledge into action
(Cash et al. 2003; Weichselgartner and Kaspersen 2012), and the
umbrella term transdisciplinarity for this family of concepts (Regeer
and Bunders 2009). This article uses the term boundary organization
largely for the purposes of clarity. The term is also consistent with
the Platform’s scope because it is often used in relation to science/
policy coordination arrangements. Sometimes used interchangeably,
all these concepts are concerned with the processes and tensions
involved in the coproduction of socially robust knowledge by par-
ticipants from research, policy, and other sectors. All share a frame-
work based on a constructivist understanding of the boundaries
between domains as dynamic zones, in an ongoing state of develop-
ment through the combination of social and historical circumstance
and strategic behavior described as boundary work (Guston 2001;
Jasanoff 1990).
This boundary work occurs around the interfaces between do-
main communities, which are always in the process of being con-
structed by those engaged in the distinct cultures of the relevant
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domains (Clark andMajone 1985; Jasanoff 1990, 2011a; Cash et al.
2003; McNie 2007). Domain activities, norms, and behaviors are
driven by rules that, although simple, give rise to complex patterns
of behavior. The rule-driving activities in the research domain aim
for the ideal of scientific credibility; in the policy domain, the aim is
to achieve political relevance. These rules inform the daily round of
modifying and maintaining domain boundaries as part of profes-
sional roles and activities (McNie 2007). When science and policy
fields are brought together, this process is intensified as scientists
and decision makers are forced to jointly negotiate, contest, and
maintain the boundary as they struggle with the fundamental ten-
sion between the rules—requiring scientific credibility and political
relevance—that drive activity in each domain (Cash and Moser
2000). At this dynamic interface, or hybrid boundary zone, the stra-
tegic demarcation of scientific and other tasks involves a degree of
crossover from either side (Guston 2001; Jasanoff 2011a, b; Parker
and Crona 2012; Drimie and Quinlan 2011). This blurring of the
boundary between these domains, though inevitable to some de-
gree, has been productive when it comes to assembling socially
robust knowledge that is of value in both domains (Jasanoff 1990;
Drimie and Quinlan 2011; Iyalomhe et al. 2013). Equally, however,
an associated potential for instability carries significant reciprocal
risks to scientific credibility and political process, which are most
apparent in debates and processes surrounding scientifically com-
plex issues with significant and emotive political consequences,
such as genetic modification, health and safety regulation, climate
change, and disaster response (Jasanoff 1990, 2011a, b; Guston
2001; Hayward 2013)
The boundary organization concept begins from these premises.
Since crossover between domains is inevitable, increasing, and
carries significant opportunities and risks, evidence-based manage-
ment of domain boundaries has the potential to increase oppor-
tunities, while also addressing the risks. Conceptualized as the
agency that bridges the science/nonscience boundary, the boundary
organization in effect spans and incorporates the hybrid crossover
boundary zone (Guston 2001; Drimie and Quinlan 2011). Such or-
ganizations usually involve specialized roles for managing domain
boundaries, which provides a forum that enables the coproduction
of socially robust knowledge by participants from different do-
mains (Guston 2001; Regeer and Bunders 2009). Accountable
to principals in both domains, boundary organizations aim to man-
age the instability characterizing this interface by functioning for
the benefit of both, or all, domains involved (Guston 2001; Cash
et al. 2003). Thus, a third rule drives activities across domain boun-
daries, which has as its goal the ideal of legitimacy. Legitimacy
involves fairness and balance, and is enhanced by transparency,
inclusiveness, and consideration of the values and interests of all
stakeholders (Cash et al. 2003; Cash and Moser 2000; Clark
and Majone 1985; Sarkki et al. 2014; Guston 2001).
Balance across the Boundary over Time
In other topic domains, this framework has been widely used to
examine the balance of tensions arising from science/policy collab-
orations. Demand for consultative scientific approaches involving
a range of disciplines and sectors has been, and continues to be,
driven from the policy domain; for example, while disciplinary re-
search is favored in the science domain (Parker and Crona 2012;
Sarkki et al. 2014; Regeer and Bunders 2009; Van den Hove 2007).
Similarly, end-user preferences for clear scientific information
delivered in real-time have been found to be inconsistent, respec-
tively, with the acknowledgement of complexity and uncertainty re-
quired by scientific credibility, and with time-consuming scientific
verification and peer-review processes (Van den Hove 2007; Sarkki
et al. 2014).
Note that tensions are not understood to map literally or cleanly
onto domains. Credibility, relevance and legitimacy are ideal goals,
important to some extent to all involved in policy and research do-
mains, where they are understood in widely different ways (Cash
et al. 2003; Sarkki et al. 2014). Although balancing tensions be-
tween these domain drivers remains a goal, boundary organizations
do not achieve stability, but rather enable a collaborative knowledge
creation process that unfolds unpredictably over time across ten-
sions within the hybrid boundary zone (Parker and Crona 2012;
Sarkki et al. 2014). In addition to managing tensions across the
boundary between larger science and policy domains, such organ-
izations must also manage the effects of domain drivers around
boundaries internal to the organization, and those which separate
it from the wider environment (Parker and Crona 2012; Verweij
et al. 2014).
Sarkki et al. (2014) focused on the complexity in trade-offs and
synergies between differing domain processes and requirements.
They found time-consuming consensus building was required
both to achieve legitimacy and to ensure the credibility of scien-
tific information through verification and peer-review processes
(Sarkki et al. 2014; Parker and Crona 2012; Hackett 1997;
Fordham 2007). This dictated a necessary and unavoidable trade-
off with the political need for the timely or rapid provision of
policy-relevant knowledge. This requirement had no synergies
among either credibility or legitimacy requirements. Where other
trade-offs were often context specific, or resource dependent, the
trade-offs required by the relevance requirement for timeliness were
found to be fundamental (Sarkki et al. 2014).
Boundary Organization Concept: Hazard and Disaster
Management
Birkland (1998) established that high-profile U.S. earthquake disas-
ters have triggered significant increases in research funding and
opportunity, greater likelihood of effective science/policy collabo-
rations, greater uptake of credible science in policy formation,
and increases in disaster risk reduction policy. This is related to the
time compression effect that Olshansky et al. (2012) found to be
the definitive characteristic of the postdisaster environment. The
destruction of services and capital greatly increases the urgency
and salience of disaster response, policy, and research (Olshansky
et al. 2012; Johnson and Mamula-Seddon 2014; Drabek 2007;
Fordham 2007), facilitating the collaborative creation and utiliza-
tion of credible, policy-relevant science identified after U.S. earth-
quake disasters (Birkland 1998). Equally, however, high-profile
disasters have also been found to have the opposite effect. Esca-
lating research activity at the expense of scientific quality, with
large volumes of often duplicative research produced for largely
opportunistic or political ends, such disasters can also drive policy
informed by political need rather than—and sometimes in the face
of—credible scientific evidence (Rodriguez et al. 2007; Black
2003; Birkland 2009). These risks to the credibility of science
and the relevance of policy after disasters are consistent with
the trade off, identified by Sarkki et al. (2014), between the time-
liness requirement and the consensus building involved in scien-
tific verification and quality-assurance processes, and required to
build legitimacy.
Response and recovery structures and processes have been
developed over the past 20 years to ensure that, after disasters, a
range of relevant policy, practitioner, and other networks are acti-
vated and brought to bear on the accelerated decision making
required in the postdisaster environment (Drabek 2007; Johnson
and Mamula-Seddon 2014). To this extent, they can be seen
as boundary-management arrangements. In New Zealand, the
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modular coordinating incident management system (CIMS) was
introduced in 2004 as a nested framework, feeding from local
through regional or group level to the national level (MCDEM
2009). This incident management system brings a range of relevant
agencies together with providers of lifelines, welfare, and emer-
gency services to provide a decision-making structure that can
be used after hazard events. Requiring that those involved in such
responses meet regularly to train, plan, and conduct exercises
together, this system is designed to build local and national net-
works, and thus lay the groundwork for future response operations
(Helm 2009).
This modular incident management system was introduced as
part of a decentralizing, deliberative, and integrated national ap-
proach to both managing and researching natural hazard and dis-
aster risk (Johnson and Mamula-Seddon 2014; Helm 1996, 2009;
Smith 2009). Devolving responsibility for risk to local and regional
levels, with the goal of increasing both horizontal and vertical net-
working at (and between) those levels, this approach was and still is
explicitly aimed at increasing the overall resilience of the larger
complex system that includes both natural hazards and society
(Helm 1996, 2009; Smith 2009).
Natural Hazards Research Platform
The Natural Hazards Research Platform was also established in
2009 to foster networking—across disciplines, organizations, and
sectors—to further the larger policy goal of “a New Zealand society
that is more resilient to natural hazards” (NHRP 2009b, p. 5). The
immediate catalyst for this initiative, however, was not recognition
of the need for an equivalent organization to address the accelerated
research decision making and production required after disasters,
but rather a 2007 international ranking of the New Zealand research
environment as the most competitive of all Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development signatory nations (Smith
2009). National Research Platforms in several areas of national
significance were planned to counter the negative effects of the
competitive climate by ensuring longer-term research funding,
and by fostering a less competitive, more stable, more collaborative
research culture in these areas (NHRP 2009a). Established as the
first pilot national research platform, the Platform was to examine
this concept in the hazard and disaster area (NHRP 2009a). This
consortium was required to bring senior research and policy rep-
resentatives together to integrate medium- to long-term research
and funding and was also tasked with developing new, more col-
laborative networks between the organizations, disciplines, and
agencies already engaged in this arena. Decision-making goals
included the allocation of government funding in order to further
the delivery of specific intermediate outcomes in support of
government-endorsed strategies, as well as the development of
research capability and networks that produced outputs of the high-
est scientific quality (NHRP 2009a, b).
For Guston, three criteria are definitive of boundary organ-
izations: providing opportunities and incentives for the creation
of boundary objects, such organizations involve participation from
both scientific and policy domains, and are situated at the intersec-
tion of these domains, with “distinct lines of accountability to each”
(Guston 2001, pp. 400–401). The Platform meets all these criteria
to some extent. Using it to assess the utility of this concept in the
hazard and disaster context also builds a more nuanced picture of
the extent to which participation and accountability mechanisms
situate this boundary organization in relation to both research and
policy goals.
At inception, the Platform included the six major research
organizations responsible for the majority of nationally funded
hazard and disaster research in 2009 (Fig. 2). The National Institute
of Weather and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) and the Platform
host organization, GNS Science, are crown-owned companies re-
quired to conduct scientific research for New Zealand’s benefit
[Sections 4 and 5.1(a), CRI Act 1992]. What was new about the
Platform was that it brought these crown research institutes to-
gether not only with Opus, a private research consultancy, but also
with three of New Zealand’s eight universities, the Universities of
Canterbury and Auckland, and Massey University. As arbiters
of academic quality, tertiary institutions are also responsible for
building national research capacity through teaching and research
programs.
In addition to integrating research activities across these or-
ganizations, the Platform was also required to integrate relevant
disciplines into five broad thematic areas. Risk evaluation mod-
els are a type of boundary object; the risk and resilience themes
were to cut across and thus integrate the three themes with a
much longer traditional association with hazard and disaster
management: geological hazards models, weather and flood
prediction, and resilient buildings and infrastructure. The Plat-
form tested a new mechanism for strategic integration across
the science/policy boundary, the strategic advisory group, which
brought representatives of relevant agencies and other end users
together at least twice a year to provide support and guidance
concerning strategic research funding decisions made by the
Platform (Fig. 2). Operational integration with agency end users
was to occur on a consultation basis, at both management group
and theme level.
Structure—Demarcation of Tasks and Responsibilities
The Platform governance structure was hierarchical, with host, an-
chor, and funding organizations represented at the top tier through
the Anchor CEO group (Fig. 1).
Below this level, the Platform management group comprised
senior representatives of Platform research organizations. Ultimate
decision-making responsibility for the demarcation of broader re-
search funding priorities rested with this group, under the over-
sight of the Anchor CEO Group (NHRP 2009a, b). Chaired by
the Platform manager (required to be an eminent scientist em-
ployed by the host CRI), this group did not include policy or other
stakeholder representatives, although it did receive advice (at least
twice a year) from the strategic advisory group (Fig. 1). Research
theme leaders reported to, and were advised by the management
group. Individual contestable research programs were externally
peer reviewed, and sub-contracts devolved responsibility for the
detail of such programs to relevant lead research organization
(s) (NHRP 2009b).
The Platform’s decision-making structure thus indicated that, at
the outset, research organizations and research funders had more
power to influence decision making than policy and end users, con-
cerning both broader strategic research funding priorities, and indi-
vidual research programs. Within this more powerful research bloc,
the host Crown Research Institute had more influence than other
member organizations.
Function—Substantive Scope
This structural effect contrasts, however, with the emphasis in the
six principles provided in the Platform interim strategy to guide
decision making (NHRP 2009a). When mapped onto the spectrum
of boundary tensions, these decision-making goals cluster at the
policy end of this continuum (Fig. 2).
Positioned at the policy end of this spectrum, four of the six
specified Platform principles reflect an active strategic approach
toward driving more evidence-based policy. These principles indi-
cated that end users should be engaged not only in deciding broad
© ASCE 05016003-4 Nat. Hazards Rev.






























































research direction, but also wherever possible, in all stages of the
research process (including decision making). This is consistent
with the high-level recognition of the need to strategically manage
collaboration across the science/policy boundary in the national
interest that led to the Platform’s establishment. Even those
principles requiring the Platform to work with end users to provide
policy-relevant outcomes, however, are solely concerned with
the production of research. Founding documents do not include
Fig. 1. The governance structure of the New Zealand NHRP (adapted from NHRP)
Fig. 2. NHRP research principles aligned with the spectrum of tensions within the boundary zone between policy and science domains (adapted from
Sarkki et al. 2014; Parker and Crona 2012)
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balancing provisions for Platform involvement in policy formation
(at any level).
Contractual arrangements also reflect the predominance of
research domain drivers. The Platform partnership agreement is
signed by a research funding agency and research organizations
(all situated in the research domain), and focused on managing
research outputs and tensions between research organizations
(NHRP 2009b). Similarly, the multiparty foundation contract spec-
ifies contractual obligations between Platform host and anchor
organizations and the funding agency, while funding for research
programs was subcontracted to member organizations by the
Platform (NHRP 2009a). At each contractual level, all partners
were based in the research domain, and contractual obligations
concerned research quality and productivity (measured in relation
to peer-reviewed publications).
Decision-making principles required a focus on the coproduc-
tion of policy-relevant research with representatives from the policy
domain. At inception, however, the structure and function of this
new research-funding organization dictated that the Platform re-
mained almost entirely driven by research domain drivers, leaving
it awkwardly situated across the tension spectrum that character-
ized the science/policy boundary. This was largely a reflection
of historical context. In hindsight, however, the establishment of
a Natural Hazards Platform incorporating agencies and research or-
ganizations to a similar degree might have produced a structure
more conducive to active policy engagement in research funding
decision making, as well as research involvement in policy decision
making.
Disaster Response
This larger tension between domain drivers is reproduced at more
detailed levels. The principle requiring the Platform to provide
research advice and support to the government after major haz-
ard events, for example, as a short-term rapid research response
principle is situated at the applied end of the tension spectrum.
When considered in detail, however, it also maps across the larger
spectrum. Specifying that research should be responsive to rapid
changes in both policy and research environments, it requires re-
search support for government response efforts and the Platform’s
maximization of the research opportunities created by hazard
events (Fig. 2).
The policy/science tensions surrounding the responsive research
principle can be related to the differing roles of member organiza-
tions. As Crown Research Institutes, NIWA and GNS Science had
existing responsibility for providing science advice to policy mak-
ers, and after major hazard events (Berryman 2012). As arbiters of
research quality, universities are necessarily engaged with changes
from evolving research environments, and are also responsible
for maximizing research opportunities wherever possible. Prior
to the Platform, there had been few formal mechanisms to coordi-
nate a science/research, information/service provision into national,
regional, or local civil defense and emergency management frame-
works. Arrangements tended to be hazard and or region specific
(as in regional volcano advisory groups, and regional and national
tsunami advisory groups).
The potential advantage of the Platform arrangement was that
for the first time it created an official avenue for widespread
research collaboration in support of emergency response and
recovery operations, which included academic and private organ-
izations as well as Crown Research Institutes. Linked into organi-
zational, disciplinary, and international research networks, as well
as connected into agencies, this new structure provided a mecha-
nism to bring the resources of these networks to bear on the
accelerated decision making and research activity required after
disasters. At the same time, it also allowed for mobilizing
widespread, coordinated hazard and disaster research in order
to address the research opportunities created by disasters (Beaven
et al. 2015).
These potential advantages were put to the test almost immedi-
ately, when coordination of research activity during and after the
2010–2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence fell within the remit
of the Platform.
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence
On September 4, 2010, the Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake occurred,
10-km deep and ∼35 km west of Christchurch, New Zealand’s
second largest city [population 390,300 as of June 2010 (http://
www.stats.govt.nz/)]. This was the first in a 16-month sequence
of earthquakes that trended eastward across Christchurch (Bradley
et al. 2014).
The Mw 6.2 Christchurch Earthquake, the second and most
damaging of these events, caused 185 deaths and more than 6,500
injuries (Johnston et al. 2014). The scale of this disaster and the
magnitude of the required response and recovery operations, led to
the declaration of New Zealand’s first state of national emergency.
This lasted until the activation of the Canterbury Earthquake Re-
covery Authority (CERA) on May 1, 2011. A purpose-built central
government agency of limited duration, CERA was tasked with
managing the overall recovery strategy and given a range of powers
designed to reduce obstacles to recovery decision making (Johnson
and Mamula-Seadon 2014).
The total cost of recovery and reconstruction has been
estimated at as much as NZ$40 billion, which is equivalent to
approximately 19% of New Zealand’s GDP (Stevenson et al.
2014).
The Platform was mandated to coordinate the science response
to the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Required to support the
government response effort and to maximize research opportuni-
ties, the Platform funded and coordinated a range of research ac-
tivities in support of both response and recovery agencies (for an
outline of the effects of this sequence and the Platform’s science
coordination role, see Beaven et al. 2015).
Discussion
Despite initial constraints, it is clear that this large consortium of
research organizations and agencies was able to bring a new level
of research networking capacity to bear on collaborative decision
making with response and recovery operations (Beaven et al.
2015). Review documents confirm the Platform played a major
role in the production of a coordinated range of high-quality,
earthquake-related scientific outputs (McLean et al. 2012; Buwalda
et al. 2014), many of which fed directly into policy and practice
decisions (Berryman 2012). The inclusion of a new science liaison
function in the Christchurch Response Center, and more recent
provision in the new draft of the Civil Defense and Emergency
Management plan for the Platform to coordinate emergency re-
search support in future events (MCDEM 2014) also testify to the
unprecedented levels of collaboration with response agencies
achieved during and after these earthquakes (Berryman 2012). As
a pilot, the Platform demonstrated that it is possible to use a boun-
dary organization to bring a large section of the hazard and disaster
research community into collaboration with the response operation
(Buwalda et al. 2014). To this extent, it functioned as the research
equivalent of the response and recovery structures, such as the
Coordinated Incident Management System and CERA, which also
bring the resources of multiple agencies into postdisaster decision
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making and activities. In addition, this research effort established
that such boundary organizations have the potential to coordinate
research activity after major disaster events in such a way as to con-
vert the urgency created by the hazard event to increase the uptake
of research opportunities, including the opportunity to engage end
users, and the provision of scientific evidence as the basis of de-
cision making (Berryman 2012; Beaven et al. 2015; Buwalda
et al. 2014).
Findings from other disaster events indicate that demand for
rapid research provision can require trade-offs related to research
quality assessment and verification processes, meaning that rapid
research provision of this kind can occur at the expense of scientific
credibility (Sarkki et al. 2014; Parker and Crona 2012; Hackett
1997; Birkland 2009; Black 2003). There is evidence, however, that
rather than compromising quality and productivity, the pressure to
respond to this earthquake disaster had a positive effect in relation
to both Canterbury earthquake-related research, and the larger Plat-
form research effort (Buwalda et al. 2014; McLean et al. 2012). All
contracted annual quality and productivity standards were met or
exceeded over the first four years of Platform operation, and the
introduction of this boundary organization resulted in a significant
improvement in overall national hazard and disaster research qual-
ity and productivity during this period (Buwalda et al. 2014). Like
the existence of contractual research quality standards, this perfor-
mance is consistent with the strong research grounding and focus of
the Platform, its component research organizations, and the funding
agency.
There is no doubt that the pressure to respond to the Canterbury
earthquake sequence resulted in increased operational integration
between disciplines and organizations, as well as with end users.
This represented a significant rebalancing of Platform focus and
activity at the operational level because it produced research of
good quality that was also relevant to the needs of operational agen-
cies. However, there are also some indications that the Platform’s
strong grounding in the research sector left it exposed to the effects
of the trade-off, identified by Sarkki et al. (2014), between the
demand for rapid research provision and the consensus building
required to establish the legitimacy of cross-boundary collabora-
tions, and that this may have been at the expense of integration at
other levels.
Legitimacy and Organizational Integration
In the postdisaster environment, the Platform provided for the first
time a national integrating mechanism capable of drawing on a
range of academic, Crown Research Institute, and private research
organizations, and of reaching back into organizational, discipli-
nary, and international research networks in order to bring the con-
siderable resources of these networks to bear on the accelerated
decision making and research activity required after disasters. How-
ever, while the effectiveness of this mechanism can be discerned in
the quality and range of earthquake-related research activity, the
number of organizations involved, and the uptake of research find-
ings in policy and decision making, this integration effort remained
largely behind the scenes.
This was due in part to the lack of provision in the Platform’s
founding documents for the specific distribution of responsibil-
ities and demarcation of tasks between organizations after hazard
events. There were also no strategies, protocols, or processes for
managing the implicit tensions between organizations, and be-
tween their traditional spheres of responsibility. In the absence
of formalized guidance, those involved in both the Platform
and the response operation shared the assumption that the
Platform director, who was also the chair of the Platform
management group, would lead and be the face of the effort that
was coordinated through decision making by the management
group, theme leaders, and others involved in this collaborative
research effort. The Platform director’s authority as an eminent
scientist, and considerable experience providing earthquake ad-
vice on behalf of GNS before the advent of the Platform further
qualified him for this role.
As the earthquake sequence unfolded, however, this experience,
and the fact that the director was based in GNS science while rep-
resenting the Platform during this period, appeared to aggravate the
effect of the structural crossover between the new Platform role and
the traditional, and more familiar advisory and support responsibil-
ities of its host organization. After the Christchurch earthquake, the
Platform director and other GNS staff relocated to the Christchurch
Response Center to facilitate a clear conduit for seismology and
land-damage information, as well as engage with the other research
programs run out of this center. This made it more difficult for some
of the programs not based in the center to engage with the Platform
operation. At the same time, assumptions as to the demarcation of
tasks and responsibilities between the Crown Research Institute
and the larger consortium defaulted increasingly to GNS Science
(Buwalda et al. 2014). Civil defense and emergency management
logs at all levels referred to GNS when referencing science and
research coordination, while those representing the Platform were
consistently understood by agencies to be working for GNS
Science. Similarly, others working in the Christchurch Response
Center often described the Science Liaison desk as the “GNS
desk.” Later, this continued in an ongoing lack of reference to
the Platform in most high-level official review documents, includ-
ing the Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Management
review and the Royal Commission of Enquiry, which, like the
National Crisis Management Center log, referred only to GNS
Science in relation to science and research coordination in the
Christchurch Response Center (e.g., Cooper et al. 2012; McLean
et al. 2012; OAG 2012).
Almost completely invisible in this official sphere, the larger
Platform coordination effort appeared to have been eclipsed by the
traditional role of its host organization. This was not the case in fact
as the Platform retained official responsibility for the science co-
ordination effort during this period. Decisions made by the man-
agement group resulted in the extensive involvement of member
organizations and their networks in both Platform decision making,
and the range of research programs that made up this effort. The
lack of visibility, however, created the perception of a major im-
balance between platform organizations. This left the Platform ex-
posed to the perception that its funding and operational research
activities were being conducted during this time by, and for the
benefit of, a single member organization. It has been well estab-
lished that the perception of the interests of one group being privi-
leged at the expense of others risks bringing the legitimacy of the
relevant collaborative activity into question, thus putting the larger
collaborative enterprise at risk (Cash et al. 2003; McNie 2007;
Parker and Crona 2012). Hence, the invisibility of the Platform
during and after the Canterbury earthquake sequence inhibited its
ability to integrate both member organizations, and recruit new
partners, working against gains in organizational integration cre-
ated by the urgency of this event.
The reversion of the Platform brand to that of member organ-
izations has been identified as an issue that continues to inhibit
this boundary organization’s ability to build relationships with end
users, as well as stakeholders (Buwalda et al. 2014), suggesting that
this postdisaster effect continued to have an impact on the overall
development of Platform management and strategy.
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Legitimacy and Thematic (Disciplinary) Integration
The Platform’s difficulty integrating partner organizations has been
related to the consortium’s limited progress in the area of discipli-
nary or thematic integration (Buwalda et al. 2014). At inception,
the Platform research focus was structured into broad themes, in an
attempt to bring organizations and disciplines together within
themes, so fostering integration (Fig. 2). Loosely corresponding
with larger disciplinary formations, the three larger more tradi-
tional themes were also broadly aligned with the interests of
member organizations: geological perils was led by GNS,
weather-related perils by NIWA, and the resilient buildings and
infrastructure program largely driven through engineering pro-
grams at the Universities of Canterbury and Auckland (Buwalda
et al. 2014).
The subcontractual funding of major thematic research pro-
grams to individual organizations reinforced the tendency of these
first three themes to continue to evolve in parallel. Risk and societal
resilience were subsequently added as crosscutting themes. In the
absence of formal integrating mechanisms, and due to the subcon-
tractual approach to awarding research funding, there were few
opportunities for these themes (led by GNS) to function in a cross-
cutting, integrating capacity. Evidence from environmental man-
agement and climate change research organizations indicates that
formalized disciplinary integration mechanisms, including univer-
sal incentive and accountability regimes are more likely to create
stable inter-disciplinary practices and cultures than informal mech-
anisms and ‘charismatic’ leadership (Lengwiler 2006).
The lack of formal integration mechanisms in the Platform
meant that the research response loosely coordinated by the Plat-
form after the Darfield earthquake rapidly evolved into the parallel
geological, socioeconomic, and engineering research programs
evident in the subsequent diagrammatic representation of the
Christchurch Response Center’s science function (McLean et al.
2012). While the development of these programs was organic,
this thematic structure was consistent with that of the Platform.
Although the majority of this research activity was funded through
the Platform, who also provided science advice to agencies within
the Christchurch Response Center, the coordination of these pro-
grams fell into three distinct and largely discrete research streams,
coordinated by and through relevant member organizations. Only
the geological and socioeconomic research programs were opera-
tionally coordinated out of the Christchurch Response Center by
Platform theme leaders (both were also GNS scientists). Structural
engineering assessment and data collecting programs were run as a
parallel, but entirely stand-alone operation (McLean et al. 2012)
coordinated by engineers from the Universities of Auckland and
Canterbury in collaboration with the department of building and
housing. Scientists from the regional and city council response op-
erations (respectively) were jointly responsible for coordinating the
wider geotechnical research program in collaboration with member
organizations and other private research providers. This included
investigations of rock-fall and slope stability, as well as liquefaction
and related ground and foundation damage. Although employed by
responding agencies rather than Platform member organizations,
these scientists were also based at the science desk in the Christ-
church Response Center.
The response operation was similarly structured into discrete
agencies with distinct responsibilities for building and housing,
infrastructure and lifelines, land planning, and social services.
Mapping onto this response operation, the streamed research effort
reflected not only the Platform thematic structure, but also the
salience of demand-driven research and information created by the
postdisaster environment.
Individual time constraints have been found to be a significant
barrier to interdisciplinarity, as well as other types of integration,
during business-as-usual conditions (Parker and Crona 2012;
Sarkki et al. 2014). In the absence of formal integration mecha-
nisms, under increased time pressure, and in response to urgent
agency demand, the Platform consortium structure appeared to
have fallen back on the resources of member organizations, and
so decoupled into discrete and largely monothematic organizational
operations. The impact of the Canterbury earthquake sequence on
the Platform at this early and formative stage in its development is
likely to have been a significant factor in the consortium’s contin-
uing struggle to increase thematic integration.
Legitimacy and Higher-Level Integration
Although meeting or exceeding research quality and productivity
standards during its first four years of operation, the Platform was
found to have continued to manifest a largely operational focus on
providing research in response to agency demand (Buwalda et al.
2014). Working to some extent at the expense of higher-level stra-
tegic integration, this focus was also hazard-centric, and to this ex-
tent may have inhibited the development of a research strategy
more explicitly focused on the resilient outcomes required by
the Crown policy strategy (Buwalda et al. 2014). From a boundary
management perspective, these findings are consistent with the
structural imbalance that positioned this organization largely in
the research domain, and the disaster effect that aggravated rather
than ameliorated the effects of that imbalance.
At its inception, the Platform was charged with strategically
managing the national hazard and disaster research investment
in conjunction with the agencies and other end users, but lacked
effective structural and functional mechanisms to achieve this duty.
Founding documents also limited the scope of Platform activities to
the research sphere, making no reference to or provision for Plat-
form involvement in the coproduction of policy strategy. Almost
immediately, the impact of the Canterbury earthquake sequence
catalyzed an overwhelming operational focus, driving the collabo-
rative operational decision making with response and recovery
agencies evidenced in scientific outputs that fed into earthquake-
related policy and other decision making, and first-time inclusions
of science as a function in the coordinated incident management
system structure, and of the Platform in more recent Civil De-
fense and Emergency Management response plans (CDEM draft
plan 2014).
The main incentive and accountability mechanism driving Plat-
form activity during this four-year period allowed it to maintain
high research quality despite this operational focus, but there lacked
a balancing emphasis on the coproduction of research and policy
strategies that focused on resilient outcomes. Resilient research out-
comes are determined by the extent to which research activities
and outputs are relevant to the goal of Crown policy strategy: “a
New Zealand society that is more resilient to natural hazards.”
(NHRP 2009b, p. 5). By contrast, a hazards focus aligns with
distinct research disciplines: geological hazards (volcanoes, earth-
quakes, landslides, rockfalls), climatological and coastal hazards
(cyclones, tornadoes, flooding, excessive snowfalls, tsunami),
and the hazard-centric engineering branches (earthquake engineer-
ing, fire engineering, hydrological engineering, geotechnical engi-
neering). In effect, Platform contractual requirements prioritized
research quality over thematic integration. Research productivity
and quality standards were measured with reference to disciplinary
peer review quality assessment processes, and the quantity and im-
pact status of peer-reviewed publications (Buwalda et al. 2014).
Rather than simply reflecting an oversight on the part of Platform
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leadership or management, the tenacity of this boundary organiza-
tion’s thematic structure was strongly reinforced by contractual ob-
ligations, which thereby worked against the development of a
research strategy focused on resilient outcomes.
There is evidence that the postdisaster environment may have
cemented these constraints, further inhibiting this boundary organ-
ization’s ability to develop higher-level strategic alliances in the
policy sector. The increased relevance of hazard and disaster re-
search created by the Canterbury earthquake sequence led to a
number of calls for research proposals addressing the earthquakes
in 2012 funding rounds. Those from agencies with existing links to
the Platform, such as the department of building and housing, were
made in consultation with the Platform. Other earthquake funding
rounds from agencies with no prior record of funding research in
this area, such as the Health Research Council (HRC), were made
independently. The Platform’s interim strategy document tasked the
consortium with contributing to the coordination of hazard and dis-
aster research funding across government agencies (NHRP 2009b).
Thus, the 2012 funding round represented an opportunity for the
Platform to coordinate research funding across government agen-
cies, as per its mandate, and thereby engage with new potential end-
user agencies at the strategic level. Coordination across agencies on
this occasion could also have increased integration at both discipli-
nary organizational levels by bringing a new range of researchers
and agencies together, thus consolidating larger collaborative re-
search programs.
The Platform lacked mechanisms for this kind of high-level co-
ordination activity with other funding agencies, and for encourag-
ing agencies to consult with the Platform when funding disaster-
related research policy engagement. Together with the invisibility
of the Platform brand, the narrowing of Platform focus onto opera-
tional engagement with end users and the involvement of fund-
ing agencies not previously involved in the hazard and disaster
management arena, this appeared to contribute to a breakdown of
communication at this higher level between some new potential
end-user agencies and the Platform regarding 2012 Canterbury
earthquake sequence research-funding initiatives. Several non-
Platform funding rounds calling for earthquake-related research
proposals occurred and were awarded without consultation with
the Platform. In the social science arena, this led to a number of
new, more or less parallel funded projects focused on community
resilience, alongside an existing longer-term Platform community
resilience research program. In addition to reflecting a breakdown
of communication between funding bodies, this outcome also
pointed to a lack of provision for translating the considerable body
of existing research, as well as Platform-funded programs already
underway at the time, into terms which would make it accessible to
this wider range of research funding agencies.
Conclusions
The boundary organization concept provides a schematic template
that makes it possible to build a nuanced model of the way domain
driver interactions combined with the effects of the 2010–2011
earthquake disaster to shape the development of the Platform dur-
ing its first four years. This closing section draws from this model
to illustrate three broad aspects of the utility of this concept that
arise from its grounding in complexity theory, before ending with
some concluding comments about anticipating the influence of
disasters on research/policy collaborations when designing boun-
dary organizations in this area.
The first aspect of this concept that makes it useful in the hazard
and disaster context is its continuing emphasis on the importance
of balance. Driving collaboration between domains, the goal of
legitimacy is enhanced by balance between research and policy do-
mains; more balanced participation, functional, and structural ele-
ments contribute to more balance in the influence of the rules that
govern activity within each domain. Perfect balance is of course
unachievable—legitimacy is an ideal, like credibility and relevance.
However, aiming for this balance helps clarify the imbalances
that can inhibit cross-boundary collaborations. When Platform
scope (function) and the demarcation of tasks and responsibilities
(structure) were mapped over cross-boundary tensions between
domain drivers, for example, neither function nor scope were
balanced in relation to domain drivers, being counterweighted in-
stead. Decision-making principles and stand-alone references in
contract and strategy documents emphasized the coproduction—
with agency end users—of research strategy and activity that de-
livered policy-relevant outcomes (NHRP 2009a). This emphasis
was undermined by the structural emphasis on scientific credibility
apparent in the design of contractual and participation arrange-
ments, and decision-making roles and responsibilities. Effectively
dictating the focus and operating parameters of this organization,
these structural elements ensured that the Platform focus remained
restricted to producing high-quality research, maintaining research
capacity, and managing a collaboration between research providers
and a research-funding agency. This strong grounding in the re-
search sector is required of a successful boundary organization.
The Platform, however, lacked the balancing grounding in the pol-
icy sector required to ensure that collaborative processes and out-
comes are as relevant as they are scientifically credible.
As a design tool, this concept is useful because it requires that
awareness of domain drivers informs decisions defining the param-
eters of the boundary organization, with an aim of achieving and
maintaining that larger balance between research and policy do-
mains. To make it possible for an organization like the Platform to
effect the coproduction of research strategy and outcomes focused
on both scientific quality and policy-relevant outcomes, changes
to participation, function, and structure would need to be made to
ground the Platform in the policy sector, and achieve this balance.
Equally, this points to another boundary organization concept re-
quirement—such decisions also need to be internally consistent, or
balanced, so that organizational parameters are mutually reinforc-
ing with respect to this larger balance. In the case of the Platform,
moves toward this balance would have required increased engage-
ment from the policy domain in every area.
This leads to the second point, concerning the breadth of
perspective enabled by the boundary organization concept. The em-
phasis on balancing domain drivers and interests requires that the
relevant collaborative arrangement is assessed in relation to these
wider domains, and so in relation to wider social, political, and
cultural contexts. When used to assess the Platform, this concept
extended the focus of the assessment to include dimensions of
the policy domain currently outside this boundary organization’s
parameters. Requiring that Platform performance was measured
in relation to research quality and productivity as assessed in the
research domain, research funding agency engagement in this
boundary organization largely reinforced the dominance of this
research domain driver. This emphasis on domain drivers clarified
the extent to which the Platform remained focused on, positioned,
and driven from within the research domain, and thus brought
the missing range of engagement from the policy domain squarely
into frame. Rebalancing the position and focus of this boundary
organization would need to be driven from high levels in the policy
sector, require a distinct line of accountability to that sector, and
would require engagement from a range of end-user agencies at
all operational and strategic levels, and at all stages of development.
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This also points to the need to ensure equivalent input from re-
search and (end-user) policy domains at the design stage of new
boundary organization initiatives in this topic area. Requiring that
the same amount of work is done within the policy domain as in the
research domain at this design stage would also have the advantage
of bringing research and policy representatives together to collab-
oratively develop participation, functional and structural parame-
ters, in this way beginning the ongoing collaboration to be
effected by the boundary organization.
Thirdly, the boundary organization framework is useful because
it is capable of analyzing the effects of domain drivers at a range of
different levels, because such complex system effects (Song et al.
2005) create self-similar patterns at smaller and larger scales. This
affords a perspective that can extend to national or global level
(Cash and Moser 2000), while at the same time allowing the con-
tracted focus required for the assessment or design of detailed in-
teractions between organizations, themes, or individuals. The rule
requiring that those in the research domain strive for research qual-
ity, for example, applies at all levels within this domain, although
the detail of how it is defined and understood can vary greatly be-
tween the social and physical sciences, between organizations,
from one discipline to the next, and between researchers in the
same discipline. The fundamental tension between these drivers in-
fluences all levels of interaction across boundaries because this is
also the case with the rule requiring that those in the policy domain
strive for relevance (Sarkki et al. 2014; Van den Hove 2006, 2007;
Cash et al. 2003). This scale-free quality made it possible to trace
the tensions manifest in the Platform’s initial parameters at disci-
plinary, thematic, and organizational levels, as well as across the
boundary between research and policy domains. Facilitating a lay-
ered perspective of Platform integration initiatives, this applicabil-
ity across levels also clarified interdependencies between levels.
The Platform was tasked with integrating organizations and disci-
plines, but a lack of formal mechanisms to induce this task was
exacerbated by a loose correspondence between thematic areas
and organizational specializations. Similarly, funding contracts be-
tween the Platform and member organizations concerning specific
research programs did not specify, require, or incentivize integra-
tion, and there was no structural provision for integrated Platform
decision making in this area (since theme leaders were responsible
for research programs). This structural resistance to integration was
further compounded at the higher level by a funding agency focus
on contractual performance standards concerned with research
quality and productivity, measured according to assessment criteria
dominated by monodisciplinary journals and review processes,
rather than on performance standards concerned with integration.
As each level is manifestly driven by concern for research quality,
the cumulative effect comes at the expense of the integration re-
quired for the production of socially robust knowledge that is so-
cially and politically relevant, as well as scientifically credible. The
application of this concept across scales makes it useful when de-
signing or modifying science/policy collaborations. It underlines
the need for robust organizational and methodological mechanisms
to facilitate integration at all levels, again with a view toward not
only increasing integration per se, but to ensure that integration
efforts remain as balanced as possible. Requiring and incentivizing
integrated decision making and methodological agreement within
and between themes and organizations, and ensuring that account-
ability is equally distributed has been linked in related topic do-
mains to stable, stringent forms of interdisciplinarity (Lengwiler
2006). Conversely, when research funding agencies, organizations,
and academic communities have more influence over boundary
organization decision makers than end users, interdisciplinary
integration remains difficult to achieve (Parker and Crona 2012).
Finally, the boundary organization concept is useful when it
comes to the effects of disasters on science/policy collaborations
in this space. It serves as a useful counterweight to the blame attri-
bution common after high-profile disasters (Birkland 2009). Blame
attribution is destructive of resilience at both individual and com-
munity levels (Daly et al. 2009), and can prevent evidence-based
disaster risk reduction policy by forestalling rigorous investigation
of the systemic factors that contributed to the relevant disaster
(Birkland 2009). The boundary organization concept is focused
on effects, patterns, and trends, rather than individual or organiza-
tional performance, and has explanatory force concerning the ur-
gency and time compression that drives blame attribution, and
other monocausal disaster explanations (Birkland 2009). Increasing
the power of response agencies to influence research and policy
decision making, this urgency fueled the intensity and range of
operational research collaboration with Platform-coordinated agen-
cies in response to the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Channel-
ing the resources of the wider consortium to generate research
activity and outputs that were of high quality and relevant to the
operational needs of response and recovery agencies, Platform per-
formance indicated that boundary organizations can be used to
integrate national research capacity to provide the accelerated de-
cision making and support required by agencies after major hazard
events. The development of the Platform over this period also con-
firmed that this strong operational performance was not at the
expense of research quality, in either Canterbury earthquake se-
quence-related or overall Platform outputs, because all research
quality and productivity standards were met or exceeded over this
period. There were indications, however, that the operational inte-
gration achieved in response to the earthquake sequence came at
the expense of overall integration at thematic, organizational, and
sector levels. Although time-pressure is part of the drive for rel-
evance dominant in the policy domain, the time compression cre-
ated by this disaster appeared to aggravate the drag of research
domain drivers on the Platform. This effect is consistent with the
preexisting weighting of this organization toward the research do-
main. Corresponding with a drift away from integration across
organizational and thematic boundaries during this period, the
aggravation of this preexisting weighting is consistent with the
trade-off between postdisaster time compression and the consensus
building required to develop integration across disciplinary and
sector domain boundaries.
Boundary organizations in this topic area will likely be required
to respond to major hazard events. Three points can be made con-
cerning the design of such boundary organizations. First, a longer
run up before the advent of a major hazard event would have given
the Platform more time for the consensus building required to es-
tablish robust, integrated networks between organizations and with
agency end users. More established networks would have been
likely to increase the Platform’s capacity to withstand the negative
impact of time compression on integrating activities across domain
boundaries, in part through increasing the collective resources
brought to bear on postdisaster research coordination. Thus, preex-
isting boundary organizations, with established integrative net-
works, are likely to be best placed to coordinate research after
major hazard events, and in the process, to minimize negative im-
pacts on both research quality, and integration across disciplinary,
organizational, and sector boundaries.
Second, the design of boundary organizations set up to inte-
grate research and policy in the hazard and disaster risk reduction
area should anticipate the effects of disasters on organizational
structure and operation, and include mechanisms to actively man-
age these effects after disasters. The Platform’s ability to maintain
research quality and productivity despite this pressure indicated
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that high-level accountability and contractual requirements in the
research domain could mitigate the effect of disasters on research
quality. This success contrasts, however, with the susceptibility of
this organization to the impact of time compression on integrating
activity across all domain boundaries, and the associated difficulty
producing research strategy and outcomes focused on achieving
resilience. Emphasizing the need for a wider range of formalized
incentive and accountability measures in general, this contrast
draws attention to the lack of equivalent contractual and account-
ability measures requiring that this organization achieve the inte-
gration and focus necessary for policy domain drivers. Including
such measures—at all levels—when designing boundary organiza-
tions in this area would significantly improve capacity to resist the
effects of postdisaster time compression on integration.
Third, it is clear that the incentive and accountability measures
that helped mitigate the effect of time compression on the quality of
the research produced by the Platform were successful because this
organization was strongly grounded in the research domain. It fol-
lows that equivalent measures designed to mitigate this effect on
the integration and relevance required by policy drivers will be suc-
cessful to the extent that boundary organizations in this space are
equally strongly grounded in the policy domain. Since the time-
compressed environment aggravated preexisting imbalances in
Platform structure and operation, it is likely that designs that effec-
tively balance the influence of policy and research sectors should
increase the resilience of the relevant organization to the risks that
arise in the postdisaster environment. Such a balance is only likely
to be achieved, however, with significant, high-level policy support
and engagement in the establishment and functions of such boun-
dary organizations across the full range of stakeholder agencies at
local, regional, and national levels.
This article, like the Platform itself, is largely concerned with
integration within the research domain, and between research
and policy sectors. There is considerable scope for future research
applying this concept in the hazard and disaster area, to policy
sector engagement in boundary organizations, to the assessment,
design, and implementation of boundary organizations involving
multiple stakeholder domains (including business and nongovern-
mental organizational sectors, and local communities), and when
comparing similar boundary organizations from different global re-
gions. Finally, given the extensive application of this concept in the
global sustainability and climate change contexts, its application
in the disaster risk reduction context also opens the possibility of
increased integration between these large issue-driven domains.
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